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INTRODUCTION
Observers of the Supreme Court have become so accustomed to viewing it as a political body that they often seem surprised when the Justices deviate from their typical coalitions. For example, when the Court decided Williams v. Illinois, a case applying the Confrontation Clause to expert testimony involving crime lab reports, the 1 New York Times highlighted the "odd-bedfellows coalition of justices" constituting the majority. Similarly, when the Court held 2 in Maryland v. King that the Fourth Amendment permitted police to take DNA swabs as part of routine booking procedures, the 3 Times pointed out the "alignment of justices that scrambled the usual ideological alliances."
[Vol. 57:1677 dissenters supported constitutional privacy rights but not statutory ones. 9 When such "unusual" coalitions keep recurring, especially in cases involving diverse legal issues and policy implications, it is appropriate to question how unusual they really are. Although most "unusual" alignments do not coincide exactly with the divide that occurred in Williams, King, Adoptive Couple, and Maracich, we find that many divisions on the Court adhere to a common structure. A few prior commentators have noted such recurring alignments in particular doctrinal areas, such as in cases involving the Confrontation Clause, the right to a jury trial, punitive damages, and 10 11 12 search and seizure questions. We show that such alignments 13 transcend particular substantive areas of law. These patterns of coalitions are not idiosyncratic but rather are evidence of a second dimension in Supreme Court decision making. Patterns of coalitions that divide across party lines are only one sign of a second dimension of Supreme Court decision making. When cases divide into the so-called unusual alignments, which are not really so unusual, the rationales that the Justices give also follow a discernible pattern. The Roberts, Breyer, Kennedy, and Alito group often points to pragmatic reasons for its decisions, such as considering individualized fairness, the practical ramifications of its determinations, and the broad policy goals of lawmakers. They 14 tend to favor balancing tests and broad holdings, rather than rigid rules that apply regardless of circumstance. In contrast, the Scalia, 15 Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan wing of the Court typically relies on more legalistic determinations, prioritizing development of clear rules, closely tied to the plain meaning of legal sources, adherence to positive law, and consistency in application, without exceptions for individual cases. When the most natural interpretation of legal 16 sources conflicts with the most desirable result in a particular case, the legalists tend to favor the former while the pragmatists favor the latter. The division reflects the trade-off between rule of law 17 values and individuated fairness. Justice Thomas consistently sided with the legalists during the early years of the Roberts Court but has occasionally defected from the legalist coalition in recent terms, although sometimes on grounds that are unrelated to the legalismpragmatism divide. Justice Sotomayor could be considered the 18 swing vote in the second dimension, a position also occupied by her predecessor, Justice Souter. What emerges from this understand- 19 ing is a second dimension characterized by division based primarily on legal methodology.
Although contemporary discourse about the Court often views it as one-dimensional, this was not always the case; early research in judicial politics often viewed the Court [Vol. 57:1677 establish empirically the existence, nature, and effect of a second, methodologically based dimension of decision making on the Supreme Court. Most scholars agree that a simple left-right, onedimensional spectrum cannot account for the full considerations of the nation's top judges, but many empirical studies of the judiciary ignore this reality. The one-dimensional assumption persists 22 because (1) it is convenient-it makes measuring judicial preferences easy; (2) even though most scholars agree the assumption is inapt, due to simple path dependence, it goes unquestioned because others have done the same; and (3) it has never been clear how to tell if a second dimension exists. However, the existence of a legally based dimension that shapes Supreme Court rulings should come as little surprise to most Court observers. Although it is common now for both popular and scholarly accounts of the Supreme Court to depict the Justices as occupying only a left-right, one-dimensional spectrum, scholars in plain sight in all of those studies is an inherent limitation of the extent to which they can provide a nuanced understanding of judicial behavior without factoring in a legal dimension of judicial decision making. We find that, indeed, a large number of cases split between the liberal and conservative blocs, but many do not.
We also do not deny that Justices sometimes allow their preferences for particular outcomes to override their methodological commitments. Some of the first-dimension divides may arise when legalists disagree about the best interpretation of a legal text or pragmatists disagree about which consequences are most desirable. At other times, outcome preferences may simply overwhelm legal principle.
Furthermore, the differences between legalist and pragmatic judges are a matter of degree rather than kind; most judges value adherence to clear rules, and most judges seek to avoid patently unjust results. For this reason, the second-dimension divisions that we observe typically arise in close cases in which there is some ambiguity in the legal sources and a tension between the most natural interpretation of those sources and the most sensible policy. In our view, the common characterization of such divisions as "unusual" stems from a highly simplistic conception of judging as a purely political enterprise. Simply acknowledging the role of interpretive methodology explains a large proportion of these socalled unusual voting alignments. Whether focusing on coalitions or the potential tradeoff between ideology and jurisprudence, a twodimensional model yields a far thicker account of Supreme Court decision making than either dimension standing alone. the Justices' disagreement rates are not adequately explained by a one-dimensional structure. For example, Justice Scalia agrees with Justice Ginsburg more often than he agrees with Justice Breyer, and Justice Alito agrees with Justice Breyer more often than he agrees with Justice Ginsburg. We find that many of the disagreements within each bloc are orthogonal to the disagreements between the blocs. The differences between Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, 35 or between Justices Scalia and Alito, are more easily explained by the second dimension than by the first. Finally, we show that the second dimension also explains many of the coalitions that cannot be explained by the first dimension.
In Part II, we develop a method for identifying cases that most strongly implicate the second dimension. For each nonunanimous case decided by the Roberts Court, we calculate "disorder scores" 36 for the first and second dimensions, representing the degree of disorder in the voting alignments in each dimension. We identify a group of "second dimension cases" that are highly disordered in the first dimension but well ordered in the second dimension. We select [Vol. 57:1677 these cases for examination because they most cleanly present a divide along the second dimension. Unsurprisingly, the second dimension cases include many cases involving the Confrontation Clause, the right to a jury trial, and the Fourth Amendment. 37 However, there are also many cases involving statutory interpretation-in both civil and criminal contexts-as well as procedure, punitive damages, and intellectual property. This spread strongly suggests that the second dimension is not a product of idiosyncratic judicial views in narrow or particular subject areas; rather, the second dimension is trans-substantive.
Finally, we present our hypothesis that the second dimension corresponds to a divide between legalism and pragmatism.
38
Acknowledging the inherent ambiguity of these terms, we clarify how we are using them in describing the second dimension. Our analysis demonstrates the importance of judicial philosophy and interpretive method, even in the hard cases that the Court typically hears. By demonstrating that judicial decision making is not merely another form of policy making, our Article has important implications for how we conceive of judging in the separation of powers political-legal system. This conception has broad theoretical and practical significance. This conventional account of the Court relies on two important assumptions, which have not been well examined. The first assumption is that a single dimension can adequately characterize the divisions among the Justices. Of course, this conception does not mean that the divisions in every case correspond perfectly to this one-dimensional spectrum; there are inevitably some coalitions that deviate from the usual left-right split. But according to this account, such deviations are viewed as idiosyncratic or random, and not as a form of systematic behavior that could be subject to meaningful examination. Second, the conventional account interprets the one-dimensional array representing the Court as a policy spectrum. To be a liberal Justice is to support the same policies as a liberal legislator, and likewise for a conservative Justice. Although such claims are 50 widely repeated, they have surprisingly little foundation. Certainly, many studies have shown that Republican-appointed judges reach more conservative outcomes than Democratic-appointed judges. 51 Similarly, Justices of the Supreme Court who are labeled as "liberal" are more likely to reach results that would be endorsed by political liberals. The fact that judicial votes are correlated with 52 policy outcomes, however, does not show that the Justices are motivated exclusively by policy preferences.
The reductionist, one-dimensional model of judicial decision making denies that judges genuinely care about potential crosscutting factors, including legal variables-such as federalism or legal methodology-and even other potential political factors-such as minimalism of decisions for prudential goals. This Article shows that a second, substantially meaningful dimension of judicial decision making exists, one that we interpret as essentially legal methodology. In this Section, we set the stage for that analysis by first describing how almost all empirical studies of the law ignore this important factor and why this omission leaves something clearly missing from existing empirical legal analysis.
Recognizing the second dimension is important not just for legal scholars, but also for advocates appearing before the Court. It is now common in both the general legal literature and the popular 53 50. See Fischman, supra note 21, at S269-70 (describing how empirical studies and formal models of the Supreme Court assume a one-dimensional policy space); G. press to focus on the "Court median" or the "swing Justice," 54 because the Justice who lies in the middle of the Court is essential to securing a majority. In the context of the Roberts Court, that is 55 usually taken to mean that the outcome favored by Justice Kennedy will determine the Court's decision in most cases, and so advocates will craft their briefs as "love letters" to Justice Kennedy. How- than the simple left-right divide were arguably at play-even if they were prudential considerations such as judicial legitimacy and power, rather than pure legal methodology concerns -lawyers 62 should not look to sway Justice Kennedy. NFIB may seem like an exceptional case, but we show that in the second dimension, as it was in NFIB, the Chief Justice sits at the median of the Court, along with Justice Souter in the first Roberts natural Court and Justice Sotomayor in the second. This pattern occurs across cases and subject matters. When the second dimension is determinative in cases, advocates who focus on persuading Justice Kennedy will be focusing on the wrong Justice.
The assumption of one dimensionality, then, is affecting both scholarship and legal practice, but there is in fact very little empirical evidence, or even much empirical inquiry, into the matter. In fact, the assumption that the Court is one-dimensional is difficult to evaluate because there are no established criteria for determining the dimensionality of a voting body. Although various tests of dimensionality have been proposed, they are not widely used and can generate conflicting results. Single dimensionality is simply an 63 assumption made consistently in the literature. Early measurement of judicial attitudes was undertaken by political scientists, who drew on the far more developed literature on Congress, an institution whose members' views can be arguably summarized on one dimension. Other early quantitative studies of Supreme Court voting, most notably that of Glendon Schubert, viewed judicial preferences as multidimensional. Schubert mapped the Justices along separate "political" and "economic" scales, along with various "minor" scales.
70
But most contemporary work in judicial politics simply assumes that the Court occupies a one-dimensional policy spectrum. The justification for this assumption is commonly attributed to two studies. First, Bernard Grofman and Timothy Brazill used multidiindeed one-dimensional .... A second continuum was most important during two periods when the race issue was central to American politics.").
65 have pointed out that this approach leaves 23 percent of the decisions unexplained. And the introduction of a second dimension has been shown to improve that rate to approximately 85 percent, depending on the area of law.
83
In fact, neither position should be given much weight, as focusing on percentage explained actually tells us little, because the proportion of outcomes correctly classified is not a rigorous method for assessing the validity of an empirical model. For instance, if we 84 proposed a model of ovarian cancer that is simply that it never occurs, it would be 99 percent accurate. If gender was added to that model, it would increase the accuracy by 0 percent. Obviously, the former model is useless, despite its high percentage explained rate, and the latter is a far superior model, despite its lack of increasing that rate of predicted accuracy. In addition, as the ovarian cancer example illustrates, the factor used as the first dimension will greatly affect the relative percentages explained by the first and second dimensions: if gender was the only factor in predicting ovarian cancer, accuracy would go from 0 percent to 50 percent.
More recent work, including the highly influential ideal point model of judicial decision making created by Andrew Martin and Kevin Quinn, perpetuates the assumption that the Court is onedimensional, but there has been little effort to validate this assumption. Martin and Quinn estimated dynamic ideal points of the Justices in a single dimension by modeling every imaginable [Vol. 57:1677 has attempted to prove, rather than assume away, the answer. In the next Section, we begin to answer this question.
B. Scaling the Roberts Court in One and Two Dimensions
In this Section, we first describe how judicial decision making can be scaled by using the Justices' rulings in all cases in a given time period to map their positions relative to one another. Then we apply this method to the Roberts Court. Scaling can be done in one, two, or more dimensions; we show how more than one set of factors significantly impacts the Justices' decision-making patterns. We then show that the second dimension uncovered by the scaling procedure is robust over time; the second dimension alignment is notably similar between the 2005-2008 natural Court and the 2010-2012 natural Court. In our analysis of the Roberts Court, we use multidimensional scaling (MDS), a method for generating graphical representations that depict dissimilarities among pairs of objects in a low-dimensional space. In some applications, those dissimilari-90 ties may represent concrete phenomena, such as physical distances. Given a matrix of distances between cities, for example, MDS generates a two-dimensional map of those cities. In other applica-91 tions, the distances may be more conceptual. In marketing research, for example, MDS may be used to generate a "map" of a product market, where the distances might represent consumers' perceived dissimilarities among competing products.
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In the context of voting bodies such as courts or legislatures, the rate of disagreement for each pair of voters provides a natural measure of dissimilarity. Several prior studies of the Justices' voting behavior have used MDS in this manner to study the Supreme Court. In one influential study, Grofman and Brazill used MDS to examine the dimensionality of the Court and to identify the median The MDS algorithm finds the coordinates that best approximate the disagreement rates given in Table 1 . The fit typically will not be exact, although it is extremely close in this example. In one sense, however, the mapping will not be unique, since a rotation or reflection of Figure 1 would generate a graph with identical distances. Thus, generating a scaling diagram always requires a decision regarding how to rotate and reflect the graph. This choice is important because the substantive interpretation of the horizontal and vertical dimensions will necessarily depend on the rotation and reflection that are chosen. Some applications of MDS present a natural choice for rotation and reflection. For example, if the dissimilarities are distances between cities, it is natural to rotate and reflect the resulting map so that the east-west axis coincides with the horizontal axis on the graph and the north-south axis coincides with the vertical axis.
When applied to the Justices of the Supreme Court, there is no such natural choice for rotation or reflection; the decision necessarily requires subjective judgment. In Figure 1 , we have rotated and reflected the graph so that Scalia is directly to the right of Ginsburg and Breyer and Alito are above the Ginsburg-Scalia axis. The twodimensional structure of the disagreement among these Justices is readily apparent. Justices Breyer and Ginsburg each disagree with Justice Scalia in about 40 percent of cases, but they disagree with each other around 16 percent of the time. Justice Breyer agrees 99 with Justice Alito substantially more than he agrees with Justice Scalia, but Justice Ginsburg agrees with Justice Scalia slightly more than she agrees with Justice Alito.
Of course, the left-right 100 disagreements are between two and three times as large as the topdown disagreements, but we argue below that these top-down disagreements are both large and meaningful enough that they should not be dismissed as mere noise. We now turn to mapping the entire Roberts Court. To contrast the two-dimensional model with the one-dimensional approaches that are dominant in the literature, we begin by mapping the Court in a single dimension. These one-dimensional diagrams are consistent with the standard discourse about divisions among the Justices as well as widely used one-dimensional estimates of judicial ideology, such as the MartinQuinn scores. There are important differences, however, between 101 the MDS coordinates and Martin-Quinn scores. The MDS coordinates are chosen so that the distances in the diagrams approximate the disagreement rates among the Justices; thus, the distances depicted have an intuitive interpretation. In the Martin-Quinn model, the Justices' ideology scores are depicted in a nonlinear scale, so the distances among the Justices do not have an intuitive interpretation.
102
It should not be surprising that the one-dimensional mapping fails to provide a perfect fit with the Justices' disagreement rates. Comparing the distances in Figures 2 and 3 disagreement rates in Table 1 Figure 2 (and even less in Figure 3 ), although they disagree 14 percent of the time.
104 Figure 4 provides a two-dimensional MDS diagram for the first natural Roberts Court, beginning when Justice Alito joined the Court and ending with Justice Souter's retirement. As in Figure 1 , we rotate and reflect the graph so that Justices Ginsburg and Scalia constitute the left-right axis and Justices Breyer and Alito are placed above Ginsburg and Scalia. Without additional interpretation, which we provide in Part II, we can view the horizontal axis derived from this rotation as capturing the degree to which Justices are "Ginsburg-like" versus "Scalia-like." The vertical axis could be 105 understood as capturing the component of being "Breyer-like" or "Alito-like" that is orthogonal to the Ginsburg-Scalia axis. These terms, of course, are not self-defining; they are only meaningful to the extent that we have a substantive understanding of these Justices' ideological or philosophical inclinations. Of course, most 106 American lawyers would recognize that the Ginsburg-Scalia axis corresponds closely to the familiar "left-right" divide among the Justices. However, we suspect that many observers of the current 107 Court would have greater difficulty articulating the meaning of a Breyer-Ginsburg axis or a Scalia-Alito axis.
The standard left-right divide is evident in Figure 4 , but there is also a visible top-down divide. Justices Ginsburg, Scalia, and 103. Compare supra Figure 2 , with supra Table 1. 104. Compare supra Figure 2 , and supra Figure 3 , with supra Table 1. 105. See Fischman & Law, supra note 21, at 162-63 (describing "agnostic" coding models in which liberalism and conservatism are defined by reference to agreement with Justices designated as liberal or conservative).
106. Cf. id. at 163 ("One could conceive of the ideological spectrum of Canadian justices as ranging from 'L'Heureux-Dubé-like' to 'Sopinka-like.' However, for readers who are unfamiliar with Canadian constitutional law ... such an ideological scale may prove less than intuitive.") (footnote omitted).
107. A less arbitrary approach would have been to rotate the mapping so that the centroids of liberal and conservative blocs defined the horizontal axis. This would have generated a virtually identical solution. We defined the dimensions by reference to Ginsburg and Scalia for ease of explanation.
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Thomas are positioned at one end of the vertical dimension, while Justices Stevens, Breyer, Kennedy, and Alito occupy the opposing end. In the top-down dimension, Justices Souter and Roberts appear to be the swing voters. As expected, there is a clear horizontal divide between the liberal bloc and the conservative bloc. There are substantial disagreements within each bloc, however, which are largely orthogonal to the disagreements between the blocs. Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, for example, are mostly separated along the vertical dimension, despite Justice Breyer's reputation as being the more "moderate" liberal Justice. Similarly, Justices Scalia and
108
Alito are primarily separated along the vertical dimension. Justices Scalia and Kennedy differ along both dimensions, but the vertical disagreement predominates over the horizontal disagreement, despite Justice Kennedy's reputation as a "moderate" and Justice
109
Scalia's reputation as an "extreme" conservative. It is well known that a two-dimensional model of the Supreme Court provides a better fit than a one-dimensional model; indeed, 111 more dimensions always guarantee a better fit to the data. The 112 stability of the two-dimensional structure between the two natural Courts suggests that this structure is robust across time. In the onedimensional model, Justices Alito and Scalia appear to have switched places on the ideological spectrum between the two natural Courts. In the two-dimensional model, their relative positions are in fact quite stable, suggesting that the perceived drift in the onedimensional model may be illusory. Disagreements that do not fall along the left-right dimension should not be dismissed as mere noise; they are based on recurring coalitions that are susceptible to meaningful explanation. As we discuss below, the second dimension also reveals useful insights about Supreme Court decision making that would be lost in a one-dimensional model. In the two-dimensional model, it looks as if Justice Breyer is in fact not more moderate than the other liberals, as appears in the one-dimensional model. But we cannot safely conclude that Justice Breyer is definitively not more liberal than Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Ginsburg-that conclusion depends on the specific rotation chosen, as discussed above. This understanding illustrates that some of the orthodoxies about judicial positioning that are drawn from the one-dimensional model may in fact be products of the assumptions of one dimensionality, rather than of actual, manifested judicial preferences.
The figures presented above demonstrate that a simple mapping of disagreement rates reveals a clear two-dimensional voting structure on the Supreme Court. The two-dimensional model explains substantially more variance in voting behavior than the one-dimensional model. Moreover, the two-dimensional structure is noticeably robust across different natural Courts. The challenge, which we pursue in the following Part, is to demonstrate that the second dimension has a meaningful interpretation and that understanding the second-dimension divide can enrich our understanding of the Court.
II. THE SECOND-DIMENSION CASES IN THE ROBERTS COURT
In Part II.A, we describe our methodology for identifying the second-dimension cases. Using voting data from 688 cases decided on the merits during the 2005-2012 Terms, we identify 29 cases that most directly implicate the second dimension. In Part II.B, we present our hypothesis that the second dimension we have uncovered generally tracks the divide between pragmatism and legalism.
A. Identifying Second-Dimension Cases
The scaling diagrams of the Roberts Court shown in Figures 4 and 5 reveal a two-dimensional structure, but they do not explain what these dimensions represent. To explore what these dimensions capture, we search for cases that are highly disordered along the first dimension but well ordered along the second dimension. We select for disorder in the first dimension so as to exclude the kinds [Vol. 57:1677 of policy-or value-based considerations that often characterize leftright splits.
We measure disorder using a procedure developed by Paul Edelman, David Klein, and Stefanie Lindquist to quantify the degree of disorder in Supreme Court coalitions. When a vote is 113 perfectly ordered in one dimension, there exists a cutpoint that cleanly separates the majority coalition from the Justices in dissent. In the one-dimension diagrams shown in Figures 2 and   114 3, for example, a cutpoint placed at 0.2 would perfectly separate the liberal bloc from the conservative bloc. All cases that are divided by a 5-4 split between these two blocs would thus be perfectly ordered. When an alignment is disordered, no such cutpoint exists. Some of the Justices would have to travel along the spectrum in order for the coalition to be properly ordered. The disorder measure for each case is determined by the amount of travel that must occur for the voting alignment to be ordered.
For example, in Alleyne v. United States, Justice Thomas joined the four liberals to form a majority. Alleyne is a disordered vote 115 since there is no cutpoint in the one-dimensional spectrum that separates the majority and dissenting coalitions. The disorder score is determined by the cutpoint that minimizes the amount of travel necessary to achieve separation of the coalitions. In Alleyne, this would occur with a cutpoint to the left of Justice Kennedy.
The procedure developed by Edelman, Klein, and Lindquist was designed to measure disorder in a single dimension, but it can easily be applied to two dimensions by examining disorder in each dimension separately. In addition, we use a simplified version of their disorder formula. If various Justices have to travel distances of in order for the vote to be ordered with respect to a proposed cutpoint, we define the disorder as . The disorder score for each case is determined by the cutpoint that minimizes the total disorder. coordinates to measure disorder in both dimensions. As before, Justice Ginsburg is normalized to have zero coordinates in both dimensions, while Justice Scalia is normalized to zero in the second dimension. The range among the Justices is 0.5 in the first dimension, from Justice Stevens on the left to Justice Thomas on the right. The range in the second dimension is 0.19, from Justices Ginsburg and Scalia on the bottom, to Justice Kennedy on the top. Table 2 . 121. In this example, any vertical cutline that separates the liberal bloc and the conservative bloc will generate the minimum disorder score. Figure 7 shows the alignment in Williams, but with a horizontal cutline. The alignment is also slightly disordered in the second dimension, because Justices Thomas and Sotomayor are each on the wrong side of the horizontal cutline. Williams is much less disordered, however, in the second dimension. Justices Thomas and Sotomayor need to travel shorter distances in order to move to the correct side of the horizontal cutline than Justices Breyer and Scalia did with the vertical cutline. The second-dimension coordinates to be correctly positioned with respect to the cutline. Because this cutline minimizes the total amount of travel, the second-dimension disorder score for Williams is 0.041, which is significantly less than the first-dimension disorder score. Intuitively, this suggests that in Williams, the second dimension is far more salient in explaining the divisions on the Court than the first dimension is. By repeating this procedure for every case during our period of study of the Roberts Court, we can derive disorder scores in both dimensions for each case. Figure 8 provides a scatter plot of these disorder scores for all nonunanimous cases decided by the Roberts Court. Disorder scores are generally larger in the first dimension, just as the distances among the Justices are larger in the first dimension. One-half of the nonunanimous cases are perfectly 122. See supra Figure 6 . 123. See supra Table 2. [Vol. 57:1677 ordered in the first dimension. To identify cases that best exemplify the second-dimension divide, we select cases with high disorder scores in the first dimension but low disorder scores in the second dimension. Specifically, we select cases with first-dimension disorder scores of at least 0.3 and second-dimension disorder scores of at most 0.1. Although these thresholds are admittedly arbitrary, we chose them to conform to media and academic commentary about disordered voting. Cases such as Williams and King, for example, were described as disordered in the media and have first-dimen- 124 sion disorder scores of 0.34. The cases meeting our criteria for disorder scores are listed in Table 3 .
Unsurprisingly, many of the areas of case law known for generating unusual alignments are well represented among these seconddimension cases. Five of the second-dimension cases we identify involve the Confrontation Clause, and three involve the Sixth [Vol. 57:1677 
B. A Theory of the Second Dimension: Pragmatism Versus Legalism
Although Figures 4 and 5 demonstrate the existence of a second dimension on the Roberts Court, they do not reveal what this second dimension represents. As we have defined it, the second dimension is the axis orthogonal to the Ginsburg-Scalia axis. In a crude way, the second dimension captures the difference between Justices Scalia and Alito or the difference between Justices Ginsburg and Breyer. In this Section, we observe that many of the second dimension cases reflect a divide between pragmatism and legalism.
According to Judge Richard Posner:
Legalism [is] a positive theory of judicial behavior ... [that] hypothesizes that judicial decisions are determined by "the law," conceived of as a body of preexisting rules found stated in canonical legal materials, such as constitutional and statutory texts and previous decisions of the same or a higher court, or derivable from those materials by logical operations.
132
In contrast, Posner describes pragmatism as "basing a judicial decision on the effects the decision is likely to have, rather than on the language of a statute or of a case, or more generally on a preexisting rule."
133
Divides often arise between legalists and pragmatists in cases involving the breadth of a legal rule. Legalists generally prefer categorical application of rules, even in situations where the background justifications of the rule apply weakly, or not at all. On the other hand, pragmatists prefer to apply rules narrowly, especially in settings where the application of a rule might conflict with its purpose. Thus, pragmatists favor balancing tests and particularized rules, which provide judges greater discretion to achieve fair results in individual cases.
The second kind of consideration involves conflicts between legal texts and extratextual considerations such as policy, efficiency, or morality. Legalists are more concerned with reaching the decision that is best justified by official legal sources, even if such a holding of defining that key term, the court merely described a number of broad categories structured around the primary purpose of the statement at the time of its utterance and whether the circumstances of the utterance suggested its likely future relevance in a criminal prosecution. This approach left open many questions for 137 later cases. 138 The questions raised in our second-dimension Confrontation Clause cases fall into two broad categories: whether the definition of "testimony" extends to statements made by technicians' reports when the individual technician is not available to testify, and 139 [Vol. 57:1677 tism. In Gant, the Court considered whether police can search a 145 vehicle incident to arrest when a defendant is handcuffed in the back of the locked patrol car. Under a broad reading of prior 146 precedent, such a search was permitted because the area within "one lunge" of the place of an arrest was deemed to be presumptively within an arrestee's immediate control. Justice Stevens, 147 joined by a mostly legalist coalition consisting of Justices Ginsburg, Souter, Scalia, and Thomas, rejected this broad reading, holding that the search was impermissible because Gant was not physically capable of accessing his car at the time of the search, and police could not reasonably have believed the contrary. Thus, the legalist pragmatists, by contrast, criticized the majority for abandoning a clear rule, arguing that the majority's new test was "virtually certain to confuse law enforcement officers and judges for some time to come." 150 Although a detailed examination of the statutory second-dimension cases is beyond the scope of this Article, the Court's recent decision in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl provides a useful illustration. In Adoptive Couple, the Court held that the Indian Child
151
Welfare Act (ICWA), which ordinarily governs state custody proceedings involving Native American children, did not apply to a girl who had never been in the custody of her Native American father. Justice Alito-writing for the same pragmatist majority as 152 in King-emphasized various facts that were not germane to the statutory text, such as the girl's remote biological connection to the Cherokee tribe and the biological father's failure to support the mother during pregnancy. The dissent, by contrast, criticized the 153 majority for "adopt[ing] a reading of ICWA that is contrary to both its text and its stated purpose." 154 
CONCLUSION
In cases that divide along the second dimension, whatever the subject matter, it is easy to criticize the position of judges on each side of an issue as either twisting the law to achieve a desired outcome or as being insensitive to injustice or even to perverse effects. But when thought of in methodological rather than simple policy terms, these two broad camps capture the divide between pragmatists and legalists. That division can be thought of as a disagreement over which type of error is better to make in legal analysis: providing too much discretion to judges to choose outcomes according to their policy preferences, on one hand, or giving too little consideration of the justice meted out to individual parties, on the other. That debate underlies many of the high-level jurisprudential disputes that play out in appellate courts and legal scholarship-over the relative merits of rules versus standards, over what sources of law are legitimate, and over the role of judges and the ideal level of judicial discretion. Given this widespread impact, it is not surprising that we find that the second dimension arises in a variety of subject areas, from civil and criminal statutory interpretation cases, to constitutional criminal procedure cases, to administrative law cases, and many others.
There are a number of reasons to think that our methods may actually be understating the significance of the second dimension. First, in our data analysis, we treat all votes for a majority position the same, without taking account of concurrences; but as we saw in our doctrinal analysis, many concurrences, when considered qualitatively, could be recategorized between pragmatism and legalism. As such, our empirical tests utilize a noisy measure of second dimensionality and, thus, constitute a conservative assessment of the strength of the second dimension. Second, because we [Vol. 57:1677 look at only the U.S. Supreme Court, we are arguably undertaking the hardest test for the power of the second dimension. An extensive literature, as well as accounts of judges themselves, suggest 155 156 that legal methodology is more important for the lower courts, both because the Supreme Court tends to take the most highly salient political cases and because lower courts face oversight for failure to follow Supreme Court precedent. A similar argument has been made that the U.S. Supreme Court is comparatively more policyoriented than supreme and constitutional courts in other Western nations. Thus, the fact that we find that a second dimension 157 significantly shapes U.S. Supreme Court decisions suggests that the methodological dimension may be even clearer when analyzed in other contexts. Accordingly, the second dimension needs to be taken seriously in a variety of arenas. For advocates, our results suggest that the popular media's idea that every argument made before the current Court should be directed at persuading Justice Kennedy may be misidentifying the median in multiple relevant areas. Additionally, in some cases it may be easier to change a Justice's vote in the second dimension than the first, particularly in highly salient 158 political cases. For scholars, our results raise significant challenges for how empirical legal studies should measure judicial preferences. In addition, the second dimension raises important questions about some of the empirical claims made in that literature. For instance, the claim that all but one Justice in the post-1930s era have "drifted" in their political preferences over time may simply be a 159 result of a failure to measure judicial preferences in two dimensions. Because the second dimension is largely orthogonal to the first dimension, Justices will at times have to choose between the way they want to decide a case ideologically versus methodologically. This understanding illustrates just one of the significant implications of this Article having rigorously established the existence of the second dimension: the suggestion that judicial preferences are so variable and weakly anchored that every single Justice-bar one-has significantly changed his or her view while on the nation's highest court provides a very different conception of judging than our view of judges as, rather, battling internally between methodological and policy considerations, which at times pull in opposite directions.
